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Article 35
August 30, 1989

The Resultant Intention

We can understand what is going on, here, by using an analogy from physics: that of vectors. If you wish to determine which way an object is going to move, it is possible to add up all the various forces acting on that object, taking into account the magnitude and direction of each force, and determine that the net force is acting on that object and in which direction that force is operating. Each force is described as a "vector" -- a quantity that has two components: direction and magnitude. The forces may be combined by a process called "vector addition", and the result is a "resultant vector", which determines what the net effect of all the forces on the object is going to be, and therefore what the object is going to do.

Intentions work in much the same way. Like a force-vector, each intention-vector has two components: magnitude and direction. We call the "magnitude" of an intention its cardinality, and we call its "direction" its target. Of course, at this point, the analogy between force- and intention-vectors breaks down somewhat, because the targets of intentions are not simple directions in space but specific realities that are being sought, and the additive process is therefore much more complex than is vector addition. Nevertheless, the analogy is useful. In making a decision to act, a person takes into account all relevant intention-vectors, with their varying cardinalities and targets, and adds them together to form a "resultant intention". The resultant intention is what determines the person's action.

The process of considering is nothing more than the process of resolving different intention-vectors into a resultant intention. Often, it is difficult or impossible to arrive at a resultant intention. In this case, there may be no clear balance in one direction or another, and one is irresolute -- one cannot and does not act. One can escape from this irresolution only by deciding to cease considering the point at issue and to consider something else instead.

Here is an apparent paradox: People sometimes feel that they do things that they know, at the time, are wrong. Yet how is this possible, given the assumption that people are basically good? If one knew something was wrong, why would one do it?

The matter is only an apparent paradox; it can be resolved by applying the notion of "intention-vectors" and the "resultant intention". Aristotle was right when he said, "Good is that at which all men aim." In Beyond Psychology -- An Introduction to Metapsychology, I have argued at some length that "good" and "evil" can fruitfully be defined in the following way:

Definition: Good is what is intended.

Definition: Evil is what is counter-intended.

Here is the reasoning that resolves the issue: In order to act, one must have resolved all relevant intention-vectors. The resultant intention, then, with its resultant target, must have been determined to be good (i.e., intended), and this is what the person acts upon. But the target of any given intention-vector, while being considered good with respect to itself, may be considered evil when looked at from the viewpoint of other, opposing intention-vectors that may exist at the time. When a person says, "I intend something that is bad," what he really means is that he has a conflict of intentions. The definition we offered of "good" and "bad", therefore, still holds true: good is what is intended and bad is what is counter-intended. That one may have a conflict in what one intends only means that one may have a conflict about what one considers to be good or bad.

Suppose I "know" I shouldn't eat ice cream, but I succumb to an "evil impulse" and eat it. Am I really doing something, knowing at the time that it is wrong? No, I am not. True, I have at least one intention-vector that opposes eating the ice cream, and from the viewpoint of that intention-vector, eating it is wrong. But from the viewpoint of an intention-vector that favors eating ice cream, not eating it is wrong. The resultant intention is to eat the ice cream, so at that instant of eating it, I must consider that the action is more right than wrong.

The concept of a "vector addition" of intentions, that brings about a resultant intention and thus determines action, is closely related to the basic economic concepts of "cost" and "benefit":

Definition: The cost of an action is the sum of all the intention-vectors that would oppose that action.

Definition: The benefit of an action is the sum of all intention-vectors that would favor that action.

Frank A. Gerbode, M.D.
Director, IRM